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drugs from packaging the drug in capsules of the same color as 
those used for the brand name product. 
FACTS: Plaintiff Ives Laboratories manufactures and sells 
the drug "cyclandelate" under the registered trademark 
"Cyclospasmol"; until 1972 Ives held a patent on the drug. Since 
1962 Ives has marketed 200mg. dosages of Cyclospasmol in pale 
blue capsules imprinted "Ives 4124". Since 1975 it has sold 
400mg. dosages in a blue and red capsule imprinted "Ives 4148". 
Cyclandelate is a "peripheral vasodilator" used primarily by 
elderly patients on a regular basis to inhibit progression of 
certain vascular diseases. It is sold only by prescription, and 
the dispensing pharmacist places the capsules in containers 
bearing his own label. ri:'hus, Ives directs its advertising to 
prescribing physicians and pharmacists rather than to the 
ultimate consumer. 
Petrs Inwood and Premo "manufacture" generic cyclandelate by 
purchasing empty capsules and filling them with cyclandelate 
powder. They use blue and blue and red capsules identical to --those used by Ives, and promote their product as "comparable" or 
"equivalent" to Cyclospasmol. Until recen tly, the capsules were 
-- - -----------~------~ 
not marked with the name of the manufactu r er; in June 1978 
(apparently after this suit had been filed) Premo began stamping -~ 
its name on the capsules. Petrs Darby, Rugby, and Sherry are 
wholesalers who sell generic cyclandelate . 
Under N.Y. law, a prescription is to be filled generically 
unless the prescribing physician indicates otherwisr . 
Pharmacists are required to label prescriptions with the name of 
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Ives sued petrs in the DC (J. Nickerson, E.D.N.Y.), 
contending that the sale of the generic drug in capsules 
identical in appearance to Cyclospasmol violated §§32 (trademark 
in fr ingemen t) and 4 3 ( a) (false designation of orig in) of the 
Lanham Act (15 u.s.c. §§ 1114 & 1125 (a)), as well as N.Y. unfair 
competition law. Ives maintained that the use of blue capsules 
served no functional purpose and encouraged pharmacists to pass 
off the generic drug as Cyclopasmol. The DC denied a request for 
a preliminary injunction, and the CA (Friendly, Mulligan, 
Gagliardi [D.J.]) affirmed. Noting that it found the case more 
difficult than had the DC, the CA held that Ives would be 
entitled to relief: 1) under Lanham Act §32, for "contributory 
infringement", if it could show that petrs "suggested, even if 
only by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle with generic 
capsules and apply Ives' mark to the label", or that they 
continued to sell to retailers they knew were engaging in such 
deceptive practices; and 2) under Lanham Act ~43 (a), if it could 
show that consumers associated the blue capsules with 
Cyclospasrnol and that the capsule color was "nonfunctional". 
After trial, the DC dismissed the complaint (with a mi'nor 
exception not relevant here), finding that Ives had failed to 
make out a violation under the Lanham Act. With reference to the 
§32 claim, the court found that there were relatively few 
instances of intentional mislabelling by pharmacists, and that 
petrs (who, unlike other manufacturers, do not promote their 
products through personal visits to pharmacists) we.,re not 
responsible for the illegal mislabelling that did occur. As for 
the §43 (a) claim, there was insufficient evidence that consumers 
associated the blue capsules with the source of the product, 
• 
• 
- -- 4 -
Ives. To the contrary, consumers associate d the blue capsules 
with the therapeutic effect of cyclandelate itself, and were 
confused by, and resisted using, cyclandelate when packaged in 
different color capsules. Thus, the blue capsules served a 
functional purpose. Moreover, uniform color coding of 
cyclandelate products was useful to patients who took several 
different medications, and to doctors in emergency situations. 
There was no justification for giving Ives a "monopoly" on the 
use of blue capsules as packaging for the drug. 
HOLDING BELOW: The CA2 reversed, holding that Ives had 
proved "contributory infringement" in violation of §32. At 
trial, Ives introduced evidence of test "shoppings" at 83 drug 
stores. Out of the 35 instances where the druggist (as permitted 
by N.Y. law) substituted the generic drug for Cyclospasmol, in 10 
instances the generic drug was mislabelled Cyclospasmol. 
(However, in 5 cases the label was "generic Cyclospasmol", which 
petrs contend is not misleading, and in only 1 case was the 
"brand name" price charged.) By providing pharmacists with 
capsules that look identical to Cyclospasmol, petrs were 
facilitating this deception and could reasonably anticipate it 
would occur. Indeed, petrs' catalogues explicitly compare their 
product with Cyclospasmol, in terms of appearance and price, and 
thus invite such conduct. The "functional" reasons for using 
blue capsules, enumerated by the DC, were "unconvincing"; and 
petrs have "scores of other colors, color combinations, and 
sizes" available to them. (The CA remanded to the pc, which 
enjoined petrs from selling capsules that are "confusingly 
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J. Mulligan, dissenting, maintained that the evidence of 
intentional mislabelling was minimal, that it failed to impl i cat e 
petrs, and that the majority erred in refusing to credit the DC's 
finding, based on extensive testimony, that there were legitimate 
reasons for petrs to use blue colored capsules. 
CONTENTIONS: 1) The CA penalized petrs for comparative 
advertising, which is protected not only under trademark law, 
Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375 (1910), but also by the 1st 
Amendment, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Petrs are being 
held accountable for the putative trademark infringement of 
pharmacists simply because they have emphasized comparisons 
between their products and Ives'. 
2) The CA erred in holding that §32 grants trademark holders 
monopoly rights in the "trade dress" (i.e., size and color) of 
their product. While the color of a product may, in certain 
instances (where it is nonfunctional and has acquired "secondar y 
meaning") be given some protection under §43 (a), it has little 
to do with the protection accorded trademarks under §32. 
Moreover, here the OC found that the color of the capsules had a 
functional aspect and had not acquired secondary meaning--
findings the CA ignored. 
3) The CA decision is inconsistent with Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), in which this court held 
that an article not protected by a patent and not covered bv a 
;, 
trademark may be copied exactly. See also Kellogg Co. v. 
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4) The CA decision undercuts the state policy behind the 
N.Y. generic drug law. New York encourages substitution of 
generic drugs for brand name drugs; while a minoritv of 
pharmacists may be guilty of mislabelling, that is insufficient 
reason to impose a competitive handicap on generic drug 
· manu f ac tu rer s . 
Resp primarily relies on the CA opinion. Sears and Compco 
are inapposite since they dealt with preemption of state law, and 
here the CA found commission of a "federal tort". There is no 
1st Amendment issue, since petrs have not been prohibited from 
engaging in comparative advertising, and there is no 1st 
Amendment right to copy the trade dress of a product. The CA has 
simply prohibited petrs' intentional effort to facilitate 
"passing off" by furnishing retailers with an exact duplicate of 
resp's product. While the reliance on §32 may be somewhat novel, 
the CA's decision is consistent with cases applying §43 (a) or 
general unfair competition law. See William Warner & Co. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); SK&F CO. v. Premo 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980). 
Arnicus National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, a 
representative of the generic drug industry, contends that the 
practice of marketing generic drugs in the same color as that of 
brand name drugs is longstanding. Only since the advent of 
generic drug laws has the practice been challenged by brand-name 
manufacturers, who for the first time are subject to meaningful 
competition. The effect of the CA decision will be to suppress 
;, 
competition in the generic drug industry, contrary to the will of 
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Amici American Ass 'n of Retired Persons and the National 
Retired Teachers Ass'n argue that the CA decision will have an 
adverse impact on the elderly, who benefit from competition 
between generic and brand-name manufacturers. 
DISCUSSION: I find the CA decision troubling, essentially 
for the reasons put forth by petrs and amici (although I think 
the 1st Amendment claim is without merit) . The theory of 
"contributory infringement" seems quite strained, and I am 
concerned that Ives has been given an unnecessary competitive 
advantage since there is little to indicate confusion among those 
who actually distribute cyclandelate--physicians and pharmacists. 
The issue is important and may affect a large number of persons 
who regularly take prescription drugs. 
Nevertheless, I am not convinced that cert should be 
granted. With respect to the §43 (a) claim especially (on which 
the CA did not rule), much depends on the interpretation one 
places on the particular facts adduced at trial, including the 
results of various surveys and test shoppings. Petrs do not 
point to any substantial conflict among circuits, and amicus NAPM 
indicates it is likely that there will be future cases similar to 
this one. It might be wise to let a body of precedent develop in 
the CAs prior to taking the issue. On balance, I recommend 
denial. 
There is a response. 
7/31/81 Rosenblum Opns in peen 
r: 
• 
- - _R__ 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell February 21, 1982 
From: John Wiley 




Whether petrs are guilty of contributory trademark 
,' 
infringement under §32 of the Lanham Act because they both cop-
~
ied resp's pill shape and color and advertised this similarity. 
Background 
Ives, the resp, sued petrs because petrs were making 
generic substitutes for Ives' Cyclospasmol in pills that are 
- J 
identical -- in color and shape -- to Ives'. One theory Ives 
utilized was trademark infringement under §43 of the Lanham 
Act. Section 43 grants a right of action against anyone who -
falsely describes the orig in of goods. It is the standard 
- - 2. 
trademark infringement cause of action. 
Section 43 is not properly at issue in the case before 
the court. The DC found that Ives failed to make out a §43 
claim. Ives appealed that determination to the CA2. But the 
CA2 reversed on a different theory, one that the DC also had - ------------ -
rejected: 11 contr ibutory infringement II under §32 of the Lanham -
Act. The court remanded without reaching the DC's §43 holding. 
Consequently only the §32 issue properly is before the Court. ~ f '3 ~ 
The contributory infringement theory is that Ives' "'--~ 
trademarked product name, 11 Cyclospasmol, 11 has been infringed. 
But petrs are not the ones who directly infringed it. Petrs 
are competing drug manufacturers of 11 cyclandelate, 11 which is 
the generic name describing the chemical ingredients in 
Cyclospasmol. Petrs truthfully label their products as chemi--cal equivalents of and generic substitutes for Cyclospasmol. 
The primary infringing villains rather are alleged to 
be pharmacists. Ives claims pharmacists sell petrs' products 
instead of Cyclospasmol when physicians prescribe 
11 Cyclospasmol 11 by name. Pharmacists have a motive falsely to 
describe petrs' cyclandelate as Ives' Cyclospasmol: the profit 
difference between the low purchase price for generic 
cyclandelate and the high sales pr ice for Cyclospamol. Under 
the §32 contributory infr ingem~nt theory, petrs' sin is that 
they instigate or ~ armacists' dishonest substitu-
tion. 
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§32 in fact encompass a "contributory infringement" theory? 
Second, if so, what are the mental element that this claim re-
quires Ives to show? Third, did the CA2 correctly hold that 
Ives had shown a violation of this element? 
In my view, only these three questions must be faced. 
I believe the CA2 erred in holding that Ives had proved that - ---........ 
pe~ of contributory infringement. If you dis-
agree, there is a final issue about the appropriate remedy. 1 
And as I have already mention, the §43 issue is not before the 
Court, despite some discussion of that section in the SG's 
brief. 2 
that §32 
tr ibJ!t ory 
Discussion 
1. Contributory infringement and §32 
The parties do not discuss this issue. 
P~h-'-1-~ 
53-z.~ 
All assume _J 
in fact e_n_c_o_m ... p_a_s_§.. ...e .... s __ ~ ...h .... e __ ,.__: ___ o_m_m __ o_! _ 1_a .... w __ d_o_c_t_r_1_· n_e __ o_f_ :,on-~ 
infringement. 
"' 
The Court has never so held. The 
statutory language raises a significant issue in this respect. 
I append a copy of §32, which is prolix. Boiled down 
to essentials, however, the section grants a right of action 
1Although I do not discuss remedy issues in this memo, I .§!9£_ee 
with_ t g_e SG that the r ~ e~ granted below is overly broad. If 
the Cour'f'-feacne s thi s- issue ;-r--EnrnR" t "fie injunction should be 
narrowed along the lines he suggests. 
2I note that Ives requests an opportunity to submit additional 
briefing if the Court does decide to pass on the §43 issue. Red 
brief at 50 n. 32. This is a fair request. 
- - 4. 
against persons who "use" or "reproduce, counterfeit, copy or 
colorably imitate" a registered trademark without the owner's ------consent. But pharmacists are the ones who "use" or "imitate" 
the mark Cyclospamol in the situation at bar; they sell copies 
of Cyclospasmol pills when the prescript ion calls for 
Cyclospasmol by name. It will take some stretching of statu-
tory language to say that petrs "use" or "imitate" the ~ ~ 
Cyclospsmol mark simply by suggesting that pharmacists misiden- ✓~~/.a,&' 
tify the petrs' generic product (assuming that Ives has proved 
that petrs indeed have made such suggestions) . 3 
Such a stretching of Lanham Act language may not be 
improper. The trademark and unfair competition field has deep r 
roots in common law. Much of the Lanham Act's interpretation --
has followed from common law principles. And there seems to be 
no doubt that contributory infringement was a living common law 
doctrine before the passage of the Lanham Act. 4 It thus may 
3contributory activity might be attacked under a conspiracy 
theory. Of course, a conspiracy theory -- which Ives does not 
invoke -- would bring its own proof elements, such as the need to 
show agreement to infringe. This showing probably would be very 
difficult to make in this case. Moreover, I have some doubt 
whether there is a general theory of civil conspiracy based on 
statutory causes of action but independent of specific statutory 
authorization. The Court probably would have to discover any 
such conspiracy right of action from §32's text. This approach 
thus does not seem to advance the ball much over the method of 
directly reading a contributory infringement right of action into 
§32. 
4rndeed, the only authority that Judge Friendly cited in the 
first CA2 decision in this case, see Inwood Cert Petn at 35a, for 
the elements of the contributory infringement doctrine was a pre-
Lanham Act opinion: Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Bevereages, 64 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~ 
~ 
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well have been Congress' intent in passing §32 to incorporate 
principles of contributory infringement. 
My own opinion tends to the contrary. Absent some 
further indication of congressional intent (which may well ex-
ist in legislative history -- I have not checked), I would ad-
here more closely to the statute's language. To my eye the 
section's language makes no provision for a right of action on 
~~ - ~ 
a contributory infringement theory. 
But the lower courts in this case -- composed of very 
good judges -- simply assumed such a cause of action exists 
without discussion. The parties including the SG -- do not 
discuss the point. Consequently I will devote no further at-
tention to the question in this memo. Having called the issue 
to your attention as a possible means of resolving the case, I 
suggest only that ~~llu~e _ t~ the point in oral argument. 
' ~ ,____. ~~,.... ~ -.,~.------- --- ~~ 
I 
would ask if the parties can explain how (or cite authority 
that analyzes whether) §32' s langauge incorporates principles 
of contributory infringement. This also will alert the Court 
to the issue, if the other Justices have not already pondered 
the point. I will, of course, be happy to explore this ques-
tion in more depth if you would like. 
F.Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass 1946) (Wyzanski, J.), aff'd, 162 F.2d 
280 (CAl), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947). Rather indistinct-
ly, Snow Crest was based upon "registered federal and state 
trademar [k]" law and "common law rights under the Massachusetts 
or federal principles of unfair competition ...• " 64 F.Supp. 
at 990. 
~ 
- - 6 . 
2. Element of contributory infringement 
Assuming §32 embodies a cause of action for contribu-
tory infringement, it is necessary to establish the elements of 
this cause. Conflicting p::>licies frame the analysis. 
First and most obviously, there is the p::>licy of pre-
venting the infringement of a federally recognized trademark 
right. It is important to assess the exact scope of this p::>li-
cy in this case. As mentioned, the right is to Ives' exclusive 
use of the name Cyclospasmol. The right does not include the 
exclusive right to manufacture cyclandelate itself. Ives' pat-
ent on this substance has expired. Neither does the right, in 
;J f -
Ives' ""- '-1,,, 
- f'~' 





~ ..AV'1ow-expired patent never included color or shape. - - ~- - -- - - - - And at this 
stage of the litigation Ives has failed to establish a trade-
mark right to color and shape: the DC rejected Ives' §43 claim t:rfi.~· 
~ 
µ-/~ 
and the CA2 did not re?ch. or disturb this holding. 
The second policy is the exact opposite of the protec9-~
That is~~ tion offered by patents, trademarks, or copyrights. 
 
protection of the right to copy. Absent trademark or similar ~ A....-
protection, competitors have a federal right to copy exactly~ 
another's product (so long as the copy truthfully is identified ~ 
as such and not ras the real thing}. 
This federal right to copy is well established. In 
1938, Kellogg Co was charged with copying Nat'l Biscuit Co's 
shredded wheat design. Justice Brandeis wrote: 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the 
goodwill of the article known as "Shredded 
• 
- - 7. 
Wheat": and thus is sharing in a market which 
was created by the skill and judgment of the 
[Nat'l Biscuit Co's] predecessor and has been 
widely extended by vast expenditures in adver-
, 
i-e.~u-
tising persistently made. But that is not 
unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article 
unprotected by patent or trademark is the ex-
ercise of a right possessed by all--and in the 
exercise of which the consuming public is 
deeply interested. 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 
111, 122 (1938). 
h>'~'' 
See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 
(1964) ("when the patent expires the monopoly created by it 
expires, too, and the right to make the article--including the 
right to make it in precsely the shape it carried when 
patented--passes to the public") (emphasis added): Compco Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) ("Here 
Day-Brite's fixture has been held not to be entitled to a de-
sign or mechanical patent. Under the federal patent laws it 
is, therefore, in the public domain and can be copied in every 
detail by whoever pleases.") (emphasis added). 
Important policies animate this federal right to copy. 
Competition is the basic federal economic policy. The entire 
point of competition is to produce what consumers want at the 
lowest possble pr ice. If some innovator produces a product 
that proves popular, consumers welfare is increased if other 
manufacturers duplicate the good and drive down price. Dupli-
cation of commercially successful goods thus is the lifeblood 
of the market process. 
Exceptions to the right to copy are made in only two 
- - 8. 
relevant instances. First, when innovators meet the demanding 
standard of the patent laws, they are rewarded with a period of 
monopoly. Here that patent monopoly has expired for Ives' dis-
covery of cyclandelate. $econd, duplicators are no~__£ermi tted 
to confuse the public about who in fact made the article; orig-
... _..._ _ _;...----------------------
inators have the exclusive trademark right to identify their 
own products as such. Similarly, copiers cannot infringe this 
trademark right by misleading the public into thinking that 
their imitations are really made by the originator. But copi-
ers are allowed to copy the good, to tell the public that it is 
a copy but just as good as the original, and to sell for less. 
Public welfare increases as a result. 
Both the protection of trademark and right to copy 
policies are important. For this reason I conclude that the 
cause of action to protect against those who contribute to 
trademark infringement is inherently de sir able. By the same 
token, it must not be too broad. It should not be permitted to 
chill the truthful exercise of competitors' right to copy an 
originator's product. 
To my mind, the SG does the best job of presenting the ------~ ___________.._. ... 
correct resolution of this conflict. He summarizes the proper 
contents of a contributory infringement action by stating "a 
person may be held vicariously liable for the trademark in-
fringement of another person only upon a showing of a guilty 
state of mind." SG brief at 16 (emphasis added) . This state 
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ly between laudable exercises of the right to copy unprotected 
goods and the culpable encouragements of pharmacists to misde-
scribe the origin of generic cyclandelate (when a prescription 
demanded only Cyclospasmol}. As the SG notes, explicit state-
ment of this element is not inconsistent with Judge Friendly's 
opinion in the first CA2 Ives opinion. Rather it differs only 
as a matter of emphasis. 
I now consider whether Judge Mansfield's second CA2 
Ives opinion (the decision before the Court} correctly applies 
this state of mind element. 
3. Ives' proof of petrs' guilty mind 
---. -
Ives relies on four i terns of evidence to prove that 
petrs improperly encouraged pharmacists to infringe Ives' 
Cyclospasmol trademark: (1) petrs' manufacture of cyclandelate 
in identical pills; (2) petrs' catalogs; (3) 15 instances in 
which pharmacists illegally substituted cyclandelate for 
Cyclospasmol; and ( 4} a sample in which Ives' agents filled 
prescriptions for Cyclospasmol or a generic substitute at 83 
different pharmacies. I discuss each item of proof in turn. 
Evidence that petrs copied Ives' pill color and shape ~? 
cannot, I think, properly be given much weight. This imitation 
is a pure example of the right to copy an unprotected feature 
of a competitor's product. As mentioned, Ives has not estab-
lished that it has any trademark right to pill color. (My as-
sessment of the DC rejection of Ives' §43 claim, which sought 
- - 10. 
to establish this right, is that the DC acted correctly.) 
Petrs therefore were within their rights by copying the unpro-
tected pill shape and color of the market leader. This evi-
dence does not show petrs had a guilty mind to encourage mis-
identification by pharmacists. 
Petrs' catalogs present little additional evidence of 
a guilty mind. The catalogs did two things. They listed price 
comparisons between Ives' and petrs' products, and they identi-
f ied the color of petr s' cyclandelate pills. These acts by 
petrs do no more, I think, than proclaim "our product is just 
as good as Ives, and it is cheaper." Such advertising logical-
ly is a proper incident to the right to copy. Indeed, there is 
a net social benefit to the extent that consumers can be made 
aware that the same product is available at lower cost. Like 
the pill design evidence, this evidence is consistent with a 
theory that petrs were doing no more than exercising their pro-
tected right to copy. Because it does not exclude an innocent 
-- and worthy -- motive for petrs behavior, it is of little 
value in proving petrs' guilty mind. 
The final two pieces of evidence do not relate to 
petrs' actions at all. Rather they purport to show that the 
pharmacy industry is rife with trademark infringement. The 
implication would be that, given this context, only slight in-
fringement · enco.uragement by petrs should suffice to show their 
guilty minds. 
My first reaction is that this whole effort is mis-
~~ 
er(P~ 
- - 11. 
guided. If infringement really is rife in an industry where 
agents (like pharmacists) must be trusted to obey product se-
lection orders (like physicians' prescriptions), then the 
agents are the proper target of attack. Vicarious attack on 
the manufacturers by lowering the standards needed to show the 
manufacturers' guilty minds trenches on their federal right to 
copy. The result to be feared is that, in attempting to cure 
one evil (the misbehavior of pharmacists), the Court would cre-
ate another: elimination of the right to copy. The result 
would be that Ives would be permitted to enjoy an unwarranted 
monopoly in pill design. Consequently I think Ives should have 
devoted its efforts at trial to illustrating bad conduct by 
petrs, not by pharmacists. The easiest way to do this would 
have been to find smoking guns in petrs' files or testimony 
from pharmacists about actual hints from Ives that advocated 
substitution. Ives' actual strategy misses the point and 
threatens other important federal policies. 
In any event, I agree with the DC that Ives failed to 
prove widespread infringement in the pharmacy business. The 15 
examples of illegal substitution were insufficient even for the 
CA2 panel in the first appeal: the CA2 affirmed the DC's deci-
sion to deny Ives' request for preliminary relief. These 15 
examples of unprincipled pharmacist conduct were not randomly 
selected. Instead they were drawn, E.Y_ Ives, from the entire 
market in which Cyclospasmol is sold: presumably the nation, 
if not the world. In this light, 15 looks like a very small 
- - 12. 
number. This evidence does not show that misdescr iption of 
goods is unusually common or typical in this industry. 
Second, Ives polled 83 pharmacists with prescriptions 
that explicitly permitted substitution of generic cyclandelate 
for Cyclospasmol. This study is flawed from the outset. 
First, 83 is larger than 15, but it still is tiny considering 
the market at issue. Second, Ives must show that it is common 
for pharmacists to give generic cyclandelate when they are 
asked specifically for Cyclospasmol. Only in this manner can 
it prove that pharmacists corruptly give way to the profit in-
centive of selling the cheap copy as the expensive original. 
By contrast, this study asks pharmacists to give ei-
ther the cheap copy or the expensive original. It tests their 
labelling accuracy, not their honesty. Any trademark infringe-
ment that is found can be merely technical, because by hypothe-
sis customers are asking for Cyclospasmol or a substitute. 
Consumers consequently are not being misled about the origin of 
the pill they buy, since in their request they have specified 
that they are indifferent as to origin. 
A disputed percentage (12% v. 29%) of the pharmacists 
dispensing the generic did mislabel in some manner. But only 
one of the 83 sold generic cyclandelate as "Cyclospasmol" and 
charged the brand name price. This evidence is strong. But it 
counts in petrs' rather than Ives' favor. It shows that the 
basic market condition that Ives is trying to prove -- common 
pharmacist willingness to cheat consumers by substituing copies 
- - 13. 
and charging for the original -- is quite rare. 
Conclusion 
In sum, I believe that Ives has failed to prove petrs' 
guilty mind. The CA2 erred in losing sight of the key mental 
element of contributory infringement. ( __________ __, Its decision 
overprotects Ives' Cyclospasmol name and consequenty impairs 
the strong federal interest in permitting competitors to dupli-
cate otherwise unprotected features of popular products. As-
suming that the Court decides that §32 does contain a right of 
action for contributory infringement, the Court should reverse; 
the CA2 has misapplied the proper standards governing relief 
under that theory. ~ k ~ . 
§ 1114 - TITLE 15-COM~ERCE ~ TRADE Page 1302 
§ 1114. Remedies; infringement; innocent infringe-
ment by printers and publishers 
(1) Any person who shall, without the con-
sent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 
registered mark in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colora-
bly imitate a registered mark and apply such 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, 
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of goods or ser-
vices on or in connection with which such use 
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive, 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant 
for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under 
subsection (b) of this section, the registrant 
shall not be entitled to recover profits or dam-
ages unless the acts have been committed with 
knowledge that such imitation is intended to be 
used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this chapter, the remedies given to the owner 
of the right infringed shall be limited as fol-
lows: (a) Where an infringer in engaged solely 
in the business of printing the mark for others 
and establishes that he was an innocent in-
fringer the owner of the right infringed shall 
be entitled as against such infringer only to an 
injunction against future printing; (b) where 
the infringement complained of is contained in 
or is part of paid advertising matter in a news-
paper, magazine, or other similar periodical the 
remedies of the owner of the right infringed as 
against the publisher or distributor of such 
newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodi-
cal shall be confined to an injunction against 
the presentation of such advertising matter in 
future issues of such newspapers, magazines, or 
other similar periodical: Provided, That these 
limitations shall apply only to innocent infring-
ers; Cc) injunction relief shall not be available 
to the owner of the right infringed in respect of 
an issue of a newspaper, magazine, or other 
similar periodical containing infringing matter 
when restraining the dissemination of such in-
fringing matter in any particular issue of such 
periodical would delay the delivery of such 
issue after the regular time therefor, and such 
delay would be due to the method by which 
publication and distribution of such periodical 
is customarily conducted in accordance with 
sound business practice, and not to any method 
or device adopted for the evasion of this section 
or to prevent or delay the issuance of an injunc-
tion or restraining order with respect to such 
infringing matter. 
(July 5, 1946, ch. 540, title VI, § 32, 60 Stat. 437; 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2182 
INWOOD LABORATORIES, INC., ET AL., v. 
/) IVES LABORATORIES, INC. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[May - , 1982) 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This action requires us to consider the circumstances under 
which a manufacturer of a generic drug, designed to dupli-
cate the appearance of a similar drug marketed by a competi-
tor under a registered trademark, can be held~ sly lia-
ble for infringement of that trademark by pharmacists who 
dispense the generic drug. 
I 
In 1955, respondent Ives Laboratories, Inc. (Ives) received 
a patent on the drug cyclandelate, a vasodilator used in long-
term therapy for peripheral and cerebral vascular diseases. 
Until its patent expired in 1972, Ives retained the exclusive 
right to make and sell the drug, which it did under the regis-
tered trademark CYCLOSPASMOL. 1 Ives marketed the 
1 Under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427, as 
amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq. , the term "trademark" includes "any 
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and 
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish 
them from those manufactured or sold by others. " 15 U. S. C. § 1127. A 
"registered mark" is one registered in the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office under the terms of the Lanham Act "or under the Act of March 
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2 INWOOD LABORATORIES v. IVES LABORATORIES 
drug, a white powder, to wholesalers, retail pharmacists, and 
hospitals in colored gelatin capsules. Ives arbitrarily se-
lected a blue capsule, imprinted with "Ives 4124," for its 200 
mg dosage and a combination blue-red capsule, imprinted 
with "Ives 4148," for its 400 mg dosage. 
After Ives' patent expired, several generic drug manufac-
turers, including petitioners Premo Pharmaceutical Labora-
tories, Inc., Inwood Laboratories, Inc., and MD Pharma-
ceutical Co. (collectively the generic manufacturers), began 
marketing cyclandelate. 2 They intentionally copied the ap-
pearance of the CYCLOSPASMOL capsules, selling cyclan-
delate in 200 mg and 400 mg capsules in colors identical to 
those selected by Ives. 3 
The marketing methods used by Ives reflect normal indus-
try practice. Because cyclandelate can be obtained only by 
prescription, Ives does not direct its advertising to the ulti-
mate consumer. Instead, Ives' representatives pay personal 
visits to physicians, to whom they distribute product litera-
ture and "starter samples." Ives initially directed these ef-
forts toward convincing physicians that CYCLOSPASMOL 
is superior to other vasodilators. Now that its patent has 
expired and generic manufacturers have entered the market, 
Ives concentrates on convincing physicians to indicate on pre-
scriptions that a generic drug cannot be substituted for 
CYCLOSPASMOL. 4 
2 The generic manufacturers purchase cyclandelate and empty capsules 
and assemble the product for sale to wholesalers and hospitals. The peti-
tioner wholesalers, Darby Drug Co. , Inc., Rugby Laboratories, Inc. , and 
Sherry Pharmaceutical Co. , Inc., in turn, sell to other wholesalers, doc-
tors, and pharmacies. 
3 Initially, the generic manufacturers did not place any identifying mark 
on their capsules. After Ives initiated this action, Premo imprinted 
"Premo" on its capsules and Inwood imprinted "NDC 285." 
' Since the early 1970's, most states have enacted laws allowing pharma-
cists to substitute generic drugs for brand name drugs under certain condi-
tions. See generally Note, Consumer Protection and Prescription Drugs: 
- -
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The generic manufacturers also follow a normal industry 
practice by promoting their products primarily by distribu-
tion of catalogs to wholesalers, hospitals, and retail pharma-
cies, rather than by contacting physicians directly. The cat-
alogs truthfully describe generic cyclandelate as "equivalent" 
or "comparable" to CYCLOSPASMOL. 5 In addition, some 
of the catalogs include price comparisons of the generic drug 
and CYCLOSPASMOL and some refer to the color of the ge-
neric capsules. The generic products reach wholesalers, 
hospitals, and pharmacists in bulk containers which correctly 
indicate the manufacturer of the product contained therein. 
A pharmacist, regardless of whether he is dispensing CY-
CLOSP ASMO L or a generic drug, removes the capsules 
The Generic Drug Substitution Laws, 67 Ky. L. J . 384 (1978-1979). The 
New York statutes involved in this case are typical of these generic sub-
stitution laws. New York law requires that prescription forms contain 
two lines, one of which a prescribing physician must sign. N. Y. Educ. 
Law § 6810 (McKinney 1972 and Supp. 1981-1982). If the physician signs 
over the words "substitution permissible," substitution is mandatory if a 
substitute generic drug is on an approved list, N. Y. Educ. Law § 6816-a; 
N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 206.l(o) (McKinney 1971 and Supp. 1981-1982), 
and permissible if another generic drug is available. Unless the physician 
directs otherwise, the pharmacist must indicate the name of the generic 
manufacturer and the strength of the drug dispensed on the label. N. Y. 
Educ. Law § 6816-a. l(c). In addition, the prescription form must specifi-
cally state that, unless the physician signs above the line "dispense as writ-
ten," the prescription will be filled generically. § 6810(6)(a). 
If a pharmacist mislabels a drug or improperly substitutes, he is guilty of 
a misdemeanor and subject to a fine, §§ 6811, 6815, 6816, and to revocation 
of his license. § 6808. 
• Ives conceded that CYCLOSPASMOL and the petitioners' generic 
equivalents are bioequivalent and have the same bioavailability. See 455 
F. Supp., at 942 and 488 F . Supp., at 396. Bioavailability is an absolute 
term which measures both the rate and the amount of a drug which reaches 
the general circulation from a defined dosage. Drugs are "bioequivalent" 
if, when administered in equal amounts to the same individual, they reach 
general circulation at the same relative rate and to the same relative ex-
tent. Remington's Pharmaceutical Sciences 1368 (15th ed. 1975). 
- -
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from the container in which he receives them and dispenses 
them to the consumer in the pharmacist's own bottle with his 
own label attached. Hence, the final consumer sees no iden-
tifying marks other than those on the capsules themselves. 
II 
Ives instituted this action in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York under § § 32 and 
43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 
427, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1051 et seq., and under New 
York's unfair competition law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §368-d 
(McKinney 1968). 6 
Ives' claim under § 32, 60 Stat. 437, 15 U. S. C. § 1114, 7 de-
rived from its allegation that some pharmacists had dis-
6 The state law claim was not discussed in the decision under review, 
and no further reference will be made to it here. 
7 Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 437, 15 U. S. C. § 1114, pro-
vides in part: 
"(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
"(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive; or 
"(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark 
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to la-
bels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering 
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive, 
"shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinaf-
ter provided. Under subsection (b) of this section, the registrant shall not 
be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been commit-
ted with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause con-
fusion , or to cause mistake or to deceive." 
- -
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pensed generic drugs mislabeled as CYCLOSPASMOL. 8 
Ives contended that the generic manufacturers' use of look-
alike capsules and of catalog entries comparing prices and re-
vealing the colors of the generic capsules induced pharma-
cists illegally to substitute a generic drug for CYCLOSPAS-
MOL and to mislabel the substitute drug CYCLOSPASMOL. 
Although Ives did not allege that the petitioners themselves 
applied the Ives trademark to the drug products they pro-
duced and distributed, it did allege that the petitioners con-
tributed to the infringing activities of pharmacists who misla-
beled generic cyclandelate. 
Ives' claim under § 43(a), 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1125(a),9' aIIeged that the petitioners falsely designated the 
origin of their products by copying the capsule colors used by 
• The claim involved two types of infringements. The first was "direct" 
infringement, in which druggists allegedly filled CYCLOSPASMOL pre-
scriptions marked "dispense as written" with a generic drug and misla-
beled the product as CYCLOSP ASMOL. The second, "intermediate" in-
fringement, occurred when pharmacists, although authorized by the 
prescriptions to substitute, allegedly mislabeled a generic drug as CYCLO-
SPASMOL. The one retail pharmacy originally named as a defendant 
consented to entry of a decree enjoining it from repeating such actions. 
455 F . Supp., at 942. 
• Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), 
provides: 
"(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection 
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false 
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including 
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, 
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any per-
son who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or 
description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported 
or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or 
used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the 
locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said lo-
cality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be 
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Ives and by promoting the generic products as equivalent to 
CYCLOSPASMOL. In support of its claim, Ives argued 
that the colors of its capsules were not functional 10 and that 
they had developed a secondary meaning '1'or the 'consumer(~ "'l 
Contending that pharmacists would continue to mislafiel 
generic drugs as CYCLOSPASMOL so long as imitative 
products were available, Ives asked that the court enjoin the 
petitioners from marketing cyclandelate capsules in the same 
colors and form as Ives uses for CYCLOSPASMOL. In ad-
dition, Ives sought damages pursuant to § 35 of the Lanham 
Act, 60 Stat. 439, 15 U.S. C. §1117. 
B 
The District Court denied Ives' request for an order pre-
li~ly enjoining the petitioners from selling generic drugs 
identical ln a earance to tfiose rocfuced b 1 ves. 455 F. 
Supp. 939. Referring to the claim base upon § 32, the Dis-
trict Court stated that, while the "knowing and deliberate in-
stigation" by the petitioners of mislabeling by pharmacists 
would justify holding the petitioners as well as the pharma-
cists liable for trademark infringement, Ives had made no 
showing sufficient to justify preliminary relief. Id., at 945. 
Ives had not established that the petitioners conspired with 
the pharmac1s s or sugges e t at ey 1sregar doctors' 
~ t prescnp ions. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 6°01 
F. 2d 631. To assist the District Court in the upcoming trial 
on the merits, the appellate court defined the elements of a 
10 In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article. 
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 238 (1964); Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 122 (1938). J ,; .11/2-{) 
"To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in I..,.'_;::.------· 
the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or 
term is to identify the producer rather than the product itself. See Kel- -e, /~ 
logg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., supra, at 118. 
5' C) /VOCJO 
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claim based upon § 32 in some detail. Relying primarily 
upon Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. 
Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), aff d, 162 F. 2d 280 (CAl), cert. 
denied, 332 U. S. 809 (1947), the court stated that the peti-
tioners would be liable under § 32 either if they suggested, 
even by implication, that retailers fill bottles with generic 
cyclandelate and label the bottle with Ives' trademark or if 
the petitioners continued to sell cyclandelate to retailers 
whom they knew or had reason to know were engaging in in-
fringing practices. 601 F. 2d, at 636. 
C 
After a bench trial on remand, the District Court entered 
judgment for thepe1itioners. 488 F. Supp. 394. Applying 
the test approved by the Court of Appeals to the claim based l 
upon § 32, the District Court found that the petitioners 
had not suggested, even by implication, that pharmacists 
should dispense generic drugs incorrectly identified as 
CYCLOSP ASMOL. 12 
In reaching that conclusion, the court first looked for direct 
evidence that the petitioners intentionally induced trademark 
infringement. Since the petitioners' representatives do not 
make personal visits to physicians and pharmacists, the peti-
tioners were not in a position directly to suggest improper 
drug substitutions. Cf William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 265 U. S. 526, 530--531 (1924); Smith, Kline & 
French Laboratories v. Clark & Clark, 157 F. 2d 725, 731 
(CA3), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 796 (1946). Therefore, the 
court concluded, improper suggestions, if any, must have 
come from catalogs and promotional materials. The court 
determined, however, that those materials could not "fairly 
12 The District Court also found that petitioners did not continue to pro-
vide drugs to retailers whom they knew or should have known were engag-
ing in trademark infringement. 488 F. Supp., at 397. The Court of Ap-
peals did not discuss that finding, and we do not address it. 
- -
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be read" to suggest trademark infringement. 488 F. Supp., 
at 397. 
The trial court next considered evidence of actual instances 
of mislabeling by pharmacists, since frequent improper sub-
stitutions of a generic drug for CYCLOSPASMOL could pro-
vide circumstantial evidence that the petitioners, merely by 
making available imitative drugs in conjunction with compar-
ative price advertising, implicitly had suggested that phar-
macists substitute improperly. After reviewing the evi-
dence of incidents of mislabeling, the District Court 
concluded that such incidents occurred too infrequently to· 
justify the inference that the petitioners' catalogs and use of 
imitative colors had "impliedly invited" druggists to mislabel. 
Ibid. Moreover, to the extent mislabeling had occurred, the 
court found it resulted from pharmacists' misunderstanding 
of the requirements of the New York Drug Substitution 
Law, rather than from deliberate attempts to pass off generic 
cyclandelate as CYCLOSPASMOL. Ibid. I 
The District Court also found that Ives failed to establish 
its claim based upon § 43(a). In reaching its conclusion, the 
court found that the blue and blue-red colors were functional 
to patients as well as to doctors and hospitals: many elderly 
patients associate color with therapeutic effect; some patients 
co-mingle medications in a container and rely on color to dif-
ferentiate one from another; colors are of some, if limited, 
help in identifying drugs in emergency situations; and use of 
the same color for brand name drugs and their generic equiv-
alents helps avoid confusion on the part of those responsible 
for dispensing drugs. Id. , at 398-399. In addition, because 
Ives had failed to show that the colors indicated the drug's 
origin, the court found that the colors had not acquired a sec-
ondary meaning. Id. , at 399. 
Without expressly stating that the District Court's find- ( 
ings were clearly erroneous, and for reasons which we discj 
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ers violated § 32. The Court of Appeals did not reach Ives' 
other claims. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --, and 
now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
III 
A 
As the lower courts correctly discerned, liability for trade-
mark infringement can extend beyond those who actually 
mislabel goods with the mark of another. Even if a manufac-
turer does not directly control others in the chain of distribu-
tion, it can be held responsible for their infringing activities 
under certain circumstances. Thus, if a manufacturer or dis-
tributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trade-
mark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it 
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark in-
fringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily 
responsible for any harm done to the consuming public as a 
result of the deceit. See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., supra; Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, 
Inc., supra. 
It is undisputed that those pharmacists who mislabeled ge- II 
neric drugs with Ives' registered trademark violated § 32. 13 ~ 
However, whether these petitioners were liable for the phar-
macists' infringing acts depended upon whether, in fact , the 
petitioners intentionally induced the pharmacists to mislabel 
generic drugs or, in fact , continued to supply cyclandelate to 
1
• Such blatant trademark infringement inhibits competition and subverts 
both goals of the Lanham Act. By applying a trademark to goods pro-
duced by one other than the trademark's owner, the infringer deprives the 
owner of the good will which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain. 
See Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. , p. 3 (1946). At the same 
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among 
the goods of competing manufacturers. See H.R. Rep. No. 944, 79th 
Cong. , 1st Sess. , p. 3 (1946). 
- -
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pharmacists whom the petitioners knew were mislabeling ge-
neric drugs. The District Court concluded that Ives made 
neither of those factual showings. 
B 
In reviewing the factual findings of the District Court, the 
Court of Appeals was bound by the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, -- U. S. -- (1982). That 
Rule recognizes and rests upon the unique opportunity af-
forded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses and to weigh the evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 123 (1969). Be-
cause of the deference due the trial judge, unless an appellate 
court is left with the "definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed," United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948), it must accept the 
trial court's findings. 14 
IV 
In reversing the District Court's judgment, the Court of 
Appeals initially held that the trial court failed to give suffi-
cient weight to the evidence Ives offered to show a "pattern 
of illegal substitution and mislabeling iri New York. ... " 15 
1
• Of course, if the trial court bases its findings upon a mistaken impres-
sion of applicable legal principles, · the reviewing court is not bound by the 
clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 
374 U. S. 174, 194 n. 9 (1963). However, in this instance the District 
Court applied correct legal principles when it adopted the precise test de-
veloped by the Court of Appeals. Compare 601 F. 2d, at 636 with 488 F. 
Supp., at 397. 
15 As the opinions from the lower courts reveal, more than one inference 
can be drawn from the evidence presented. Prior to trial, test shoppers 
hired by Ives gave CYCLOSPASMOL prescriptions on which the "sub-
stitution permissible" line was signed to 83 New York pharmacists. 
Forty-eight of the pharmacists dispensed CYCLOSPASMOL; the rest dis-
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638 F. 2d, at 543. By rejecting the District Court's findings 
simply because it would have given more weight to evidence 
of mislabeling than did the trial court, the Court of Appeals 
clearly erred. Determining the weight and credibility of the 
evidence is the special province of the trier of fact. Because 
the trial court's findings concerning the significance of the in-
stances of mislabling were not clearly erroneous, they should 
not have been disturbed. 
Next, after completing its own review of the evidence, the ( 
Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was "clearly 
sufficient to establish a § 32 violation." 638 F. 2d, at 543. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals was influ-
enced oy several factors. First, it thought petitioners rea-
sonably could have anticipated misconduct by a substantial 
number of the pharmacists who were provided imitative, 
lower-priced products which, if substituted for the higher-
priced brand name without passing on savings to consumers, 
could provide an economic advantage to the pharmacists. 
Ibid. 16 Second, it disagreed with the trial court's finding that 
drug included the word CYCLOSPASMOL on the label, although 4 of 
those 10 also included some form of the word "generic. " Nine of the 10 
told the consumer of the substitution. Only 1 of the 10 charged the brand 
name price for the generic drug. 488 F. Supp. , at 397. 
The District Court concluded that that evidence did not justify the infer-
ence that petitioners' catalogs invite pharmacists to mislabel. Ibid. The 
Court of Appeals, emphasizing that 10 of the 35 druggists who dispensed a 
generic drug mislabeled it as CYCLOSPASMOL, found a pattern of sub-
stitution and mislabeling. 638 F. 2d, at 543. The dissenting judge on the 
appellate panel, emphasizing that only 1 of 83 pharmacists attempted an 
illegal substitution and reaped a profit made possible by the color imitation, 
concluded the facts supported the District Court's finding that mislabeling 
resulted from confusion about the substitution laws rather than from profit 
considerations. Id. , at 546. 
On the basis of the record before us, the inferences drawn by the District 
Court are not, as a matter of law, unreasonable. 
1
• The Court of Appeals cited no evidence to support its conclusion, 
which apparently rests upon the assumption that a pharmacist who has 
- -
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the mislabeling which did occur reflected confusion about 
state law requirements. Id., at 544. 11 Third, it concluded 
that illegal substitution and mislabeling in New York are nei-
ther de minimis nor inadvertent. Ibid. 18 Finally, the Court 
of Appeals indicated it was further influenced by the fact that 
petitioners did not offer "any persuasive evidence of a legiti-
mate reason unrelated to CYCLOSPASMOL" for producing 
an imitative product. Ibid. 19 
been provided an imitative generic drug will be unable to resist the tempta-
tion to profit from illegal activity. We find no support in the record for 
such a far-reaching conclusion. Moreover, the assumption is inconsistent 
with the District Court's finding that only a "few instances," rather than a 
substantial number, of mislabelings occurred. 488 F. Supp., at 397. 
11 The Court of Appeals characterized the District Court's finding as 
resting on "a short and casual exchange with a witness . .. . " 638 F. 2d, at 
544. The District Court, however, stated its conclusion that pharmacists 
did not understand the drug substitution law rested upon the fact that, in 
numerous instances, a pharmacist told a consumer that state law prohib-
ited filling prescriptions with generic products, even though the consumer 
had presented a prescription allowing generic substitution. 488 F. Supp., 
at 398. 
18 In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of 
the fact that, in May 1980, six indictments were handed down in New York 
City charging pharmacists with substituting cyclandelate for CYCLO-
SPASMOL. We note that the evidence of which the Court of Appeals 
took judicial notice not only involved no convictions but also reflected 
knowledge that was not available when the District Court rendered its de-
cision. Moreover, even if the District Court failed to consider relevant ev-
idence, which would have been an error of law, the Court of Appeals, 
rather than make its own factual determination, should have remanded for 
further proceedings to allow the trial court to consider the evidence. See 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, -- U.S. --, at -- (1982). 
19 To reach that conclusion, the Court of Appeals necessarily rejected the 
District Court's finding that, on the facts before it, the capsule colors were 
functional. See p. 8, supra. Whether a particular feature of a product is 
functional is a factual issue. E. g., Vuitton et Fils S .A. v. J. Young Enter-
prises, Inc., 644 F. 2d 769, 775 (CA9 1981). While the doctrine of 
functionality is most directly related to the question of whether a defend-
ant has violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see generally, Note, The Prob- • 
- -
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Each of those conclusions is contrary to the findings of the 
District Court. An appellate court cannot substitute its in-
terpretation of the evidence for that of the trial court simply 
because the reviewing court "might give the facts another 
construction, resolve the ambiguities differently, and find a 
more sinister cast to actions which the District Court appar-
ently deemed innocent." United States v. Real Estate 
Boards, 339 U. S. 485, 495 (1950). 
V 
The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside findings of fact 
that were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners violated § 32 of 
the Lanham Act is reversed. 
Additionally, although the District Court also dismissed 
Ives' claims alleging that the petitioners violated § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act and the state unfair competition law, the 
Court of Appeals did not address those claims. Because 
§ 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32, 
the District Court's decision dismissing Ives' claim that the 
petitioners violated § 43(a) must be independently reviewed. 
Therefore, we remand to the Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
lem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 77 (1982), a finding of functionality 
can also be relevant to an action involving § 32. For instance, the trial 
court's finding in this action that the capsule colors are functional provides 
an explanation for the petitioners' decision to imitate the Ives product's 
appearance. 
t - -
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Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: SOC's draft in No. 80-2182, Inwood Labs 
My general reaction to this draft is very favorable. SOC 
has written the case narrowly, as an application of the rules of 
appellate review as elaborated by the Court's recent decision in ---Swint. Although she has not devoted much space to finding that §32 
does in fact cover the theory that the plaintiff advances, the at-
tention SOC does devote refers back to the legislative history of 
the Lanham Act. See draft at 9 and n. 13. This satisfies the con-
cerns I raised in my bench memo at 3-5. 
My only substantive concern revolves around the draft's 
invocation of the concept of "functionality." This term is of rele-
vance to trademark actions under §43(a) of the Act, as SOC notes in 
her final footnote 19. The draft, of course, avoids passing on the -- --~ - -----
mer its of §43. The functionality doctrine is not of direct rele-
---.-
vance to the §32 action at issue in this case, as SOC also notes in 
that footnote. Importantly, the concept as developed in the lower 
~ courts is q ~ ar and is the subject of conflicting def in i-
t ions. (In9eed, the CA3 is in conflict with the CA2 regarding the 
-
color of the very pills in this case. The CA3's "functionality" 
definition led it to conclude that the pill color is not functional, 
while the DC in this case decided that color was functional.) 
SOC defines the term "functionality" in acceptably brQ_s.d ------and cautious terms in her note 10. Yet in her note 19 she states 




- that the issue of functionality "is a factual question." This is 
-
-
true -- in part. But as the conflicting CA "functionality" defini- I 
tions illustrate, there also is a question of law involved. Conse-
quently SOC's criticism / that the CA2 rejected the DC's functionality 
finding without stating it to be clearly erroneous is only partially 
justified. As a mixed question of law and fact, the CA2 could have 
simply disagreed with the DC's legal definition of functionality. 
The Court would have no legitimate grounds for criticizing the CA2's 
failure to adhere to the DC's factual finding -- if the CA2 in fact 
thought that the DC had utilized an incorrect legal definition of 
functionality. 
Consequently SOC' s footnote n eds a little elaboration to 
avoid being accused of engaging in faulty criticism. She should 
point out that the CA2 either should have identified the DC's find-
ing of functionality as clearly erroneous as a factual matter, or 
should have pointed out that the DC's functionality definition was 
incorrect as a legal matter. Because the CA2 did neither, it justi-
fiably is open to criticism. 
I have spoken to SOC' clerk on this case, and she seemed ---....... 
quite agreeable to correcting this problem. I recommend that you 
join the draft, but include in your note a comment to the effect 
that note 19 should be amended to reflect the fact that 
functionality is a mixed question of law and fact. 
- -
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~a-S'Jrirtgion, ~. C!J. 20.;i'1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 6, 1982 
Re: 80-2182 - Inwood Laboratories v. 
Ives Laboratories 
Dear Sandra: 
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Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: SOC n. 11 in Inwood Labs 
9~ 
~ 
After looking through some treatises, it appears that no 
one case from this Court gives an all-inclusive definition of 
secondary meaning. The commentators seem to enjoy describing 
what an amorphous term "secondary meaning" is. But a typical 
definition is that given by McCarthy: "The prime element of sec-
ondary meaning is a mental association in buyers' minds between 
the alleged mark and a single source of the product." 1 McCar-
- thy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 516 (1973). 
-
I think SOC's definition could be generalized in ade-
quate fashion by simply replacing the word "producer" with 
"source of the product." Th ~ change is so minor that I doubt it 
would meet with resistance. In any event, because her present 
phrasing is a close paraphrasing of the opinion in the Kellogg 
Co. case, I do not think that it will do any harm or make any new 
law. 
118 OCTOBER TERM, 1938. 
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others soon after. Since during the life of the patents 
"Shredded Wheat" was the general d~signation of the 
patented product, there passed to the public upon the 
expiration of the patent, not only the right to make the 
article as it was made during the patent period, but also 
the right to apply thereto the name by which it had be-
come known. As was said in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. 
Co., 163 U. S. 169, 185: 
"It equally follows from the cessation of the monopoly 
and the falling of the patented device into the domain 
of things public, that along with the public ownership 
of the device there must also necessarily pass to the pub-
lic the generic designation of the thing which has arisen 
during the monopoly .... To say otherwise would _ be to 
hold that, although the public had acquired the device 
covered by the patent, yet the owner of the patent or the 
manufacturer of the patented thing had retained the des-
ignated name which was essentially necessary to vest the 
public with the full enjoyment of that which had become 
theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly." 
It is contended that the plaintiff has the exclusive right 
to the name "Shredded Wheat," because those words ac-
quired the "secondary meaning" of shredded wheat made 
at Niagara Falls by the plaintiff's predecessor. There is 
no basis here for applying the doctrine of secondary 
meaning. The evidence shows only that due to the long 
period in which the plaintiff or its predecessor was the 
only manufacturer of the product, many people have 
come to associate the product, and as a consequence the 
name by which the product is generally known, with the 
plaintiff's factory at Niagara Falls. But to establish a 
trade name in the term "shredded wheat" the plaintiff 
must show more than a subordinate meaning which ap-
plies to it. It must show that the primary significance 
of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not 
the product but the producer. This it as no e 
KELLOGG CO. v. NAT. BISCUIT CO. 119 
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showing which it has made does not entitle it to the 
exclusive use of the term shredded wheat but merely 
entitles it to require that the defendant use reasonable 
care to inform the public of the source of its product. 
The plaintiff seems to contend that even if Kellogg 
Company acquired upon the expiration of the patents 
the right to use the name shredded wheat, the right was 
lost by delay. The argument is that Kellogg Company, 
although the largest producer of breakfast cereals in the 
country, did not seriously attempt to make shredded 
wheat, or to challenge plaintiff's right to that name until 
1927, and that meanwhile plaintiff's predecessor had ex-
pended more than $17,000,000 in making the name a 
household word and identifying the product with its 
manufacture. Those facts are without legal significance. 
Kellogg Company's right was not one dependent upon 
diligent exercise. Like every other member of the public, 
it was, and remained, free to make shredded wheat when 
it chose to do so; and to call the product by its generic 
name. The only obligation resting upon Kellogg Com-
pany was to identify its own product lest it be mistaken 
for that of the plaintiff. • 
Second. The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell 
shredded wheat in the form of a pillow-shaped biscuitr-
the form in which the article became known to the public. 
That is the form in which shredded wheat was made 
under the basic patent. The patented machines used 
were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits. 
And a design patent was taken out to cover the pillow-
shaped form.4 Hence, upon expiration of the patents 
• The design patent would have expired by limitations in 1909. In 
1908 it was declared invalid by a district judge on the ground that the 
design had been in public use for more than two years prior to the 
application for the patent and theretofore had already been dedicated 
to the public. Natural Foods Co. v. Bulkley, No. 28,530, U. S. Dist. 
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May 10, 1982 
Re: 80-2182 - Inwood Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 
Dear Sandra, 
I vote to reverse primarily because (1) I thought 
the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Lanham Act 
was wrong -- that it permitted a finding of 
contributory infringement based on the use of non-
functional colors without knowledge or intent that 
passing-off was occurring, unduly watering down what is 
necessary to prove contributory infringement; and (2) 
because I was not sure that the Court of Appeals 
employed the proper standard of review with respect to 
functionality. I would not have voted to grant on the 
basis of our own reassessment of the facts under the 
proper statutory standard or the proper standard of 
review, and I would rather not reverse on this basis. 
I am considering writing separately. 
Si ncerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 
Cop t es to th e Confe rence 
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"1ay 11, 1982 
80-2182 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
I would have no objection to the substitute for 




cc: ~he Conference 
Sincerely, 
.c:. In footnot,e 11., p. Ii, i.t may be more accurate to 
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in the thi.rd line of the footnote. Although your quote 
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No. 81-11 - Darby Drug Co. v. Ives Laboratories 
Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your response of May 1 0. 
now join your opinion. 
Justice O'Connor 
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